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Abstract Multiple Listing Service data are employed to examine how the
type of agency representation inﬂuences the sale price of a
residential property. The results differ by property size. The type
of agency representation is relevant only for some segments of
the market, mainly smaller- to medium-sized properties. For a
certain range of property sizes, buyers who engage a buyer’s
agent pay on average 2% less. However, an above average
buyer’s agent commission can more than cancel this price effect.
Buyers that engage a buyer’s agent that comes from the same
ﬁrm as the listing agent never pay more for a house.
Introduction
Real estate agency issues have motivated a large number of studies since the
pioneering work of Yinger (1981). The recent surveys by Benjamin, Jud and
Sirmans (2000a, 2000b) provide valuable information on the breadth and scope
of the issues in this area. One of the areas of current interest, both inside and
outside academe, is the impact of the type of agent representation on the sale
price of houses. This issue is important because it has the potential to trigger
regulatory and legislative changes to agency representation with signiﬁcant
consequences for the size and distribution of real estate commissions and,
ultimately, for the structure of the real estate brokerage industry.1
The literature on the impact of agent representation on sale price is rather thin.
Most early studies, such as Jud and Frew (1986), are concerned with the issue of
how for-sale-by-owner (FSBO) sales compare to those through the broker-assisted
Multiple Listing Service (MLS). None of the early studies differentiates among
different types of agent representation and, therefore, cannot provide direct
guidance for this study. Elder, Zumpano and Baryla (2000) appears to be the ﬁrst
to examine the impact on price of the type of agent representation. Based on a
national data set with several buyer but few housing characteristics, they conclude
that the newly emerging buyer brokers have no impact on price compared to
traditional agents.
The present study examines a different angle of the link between the type of agent
representation and sale price than earlier work. In particular, only those sales are166  Zietz and Newsome
examined that involve a form of the dominant designated agency relationship.
Sales brokered by exclusive buyer brokers are not contained in the data set. The
study provides for an encompassing view of the role of agency representation by
combining evidence on the impact of the type of agent representation on price
with evidence on the impact of the buyer’s agent commission.2 The study is based
on a local data set taken from the MLS.
The article is organized as follows. The next section provides pertinent information
on the link between agency representation and housing prices. Next, the data are
introduced and the estimation results presented and discussed. The article ends
with a brief summary of the empirical results and some tentative policy
conclusions relating to the regulation of real estate agency.
 The Economics of Agency Representation
The traditional agency/subagency relationship came into focus with the advent of
the MLS. The listing agent was the seller’s main agent. All other agents within
the MLS were subagents of the listing agent by the listing contract and the MLS
bylaws.
Potential buyers who were being shown properties by an MLS-afﬁliated real estate
agent were typically of the opinion that their agent would represent their interests.
This view was either explicitly or implicitly supported by the acts of the real
estate agent. Therefore, a legal agency relationship between buyer and MLS agent
was typically created by implication and the MLS agent was, therefore, cast in
the role of a dual agent. This was not only illegal because it was undisclosed and
not agreed on by all parties, but it also created a conﬂict of interest for the MLS
agent. If the agent truly represented the best interests of the seller, as mandated
by the subagent status, he/she would violate the ﬁduciary requirements of the
implied agency with the buyer. If the agent truly represented the buyer, he/she
violated the explicit and contracted agency with the seller under the subagency
requirements of the MLS agreement.
This inherent conﬂict of interest made the agency/subagency representation an
easy target of consumer advocacy groups and, over time, led all states to revamp
industry regulation. All states now require disclosure of agency representation.
Most states have adopted the designated agency principle, which allows for four
different scenarios of agency representation:
A. The listing agent represents solely the seller. The buyer is a customer and
has the right to be dealt with fairly and honestly but has to watch out for
his/her own interests. The listing agent advises the seller on how to
negotiate with the buyer and has an obligation to reveal all information
obtained from the buyer to the seller.
B. The listing agent acts as a limited dual agent for both buyer and seller.
Both buyer and seller can share conﬁdential information with the agentThe Sale Price of Houses  167
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and can expect that this information will not be revealed to the other
party.
C. The listing agent is designated by his/her broker as the exclusive agent
of the seller for a particular listing. All other agents within the same ﬁrm
are designated as buyer’s agents, representing exclusively the buyer. In
this case, the broker is a limited dual broker, charged with overseeing the
transactions and ensuring that buyer and seller are treated fairly.
D. The listing agent is designated as the exclusive seller’s agent as in
scenario C. But if an agent from another ﬁrm represents the buyer, then
the broker is the seller’s exclusive broker with the broker and agent from
the other ﬁrm representing the buyer.
Whatever the type of designated agency, it has to be revealed to both the seller
and the buyer in clear and unambiguous form that represents whom and what this
representation means. This disclosure has to be acknowledged in writing.
Designated agency representation has been challenged on the grounds that, in
everyday practice, buyers have gained little if anything relative to the phased-out
agency/subagency representation.3 This argument rests on the idea that agents
continue to have a conﬂict of interest.
In particular, in scenario A there is no incentive for agents to make sure buyers
fully understand their role as customers because few if any buyers would agree
to a customer status if they clearly understood the implications. For example, if
the buyer is a customer and makes a low offer, the seller’s agent is obligated to
reveal to the seller if he/she thinks a higher price can be obtained. If buyers were
fully aware of that, they would choose a buyer’s agent, which, in turn, would
typically cut the listing agent’s commission in half. Hence, the listing agent has
a strong incentive to obfuscate rather than clarify the agency representation issue
to the buyer.
In scenario B, the limited dual agency scenario, agents have again a strong interest
not to reveal to buyers that they cannot expect to be represented fully. If they did,
buyers would choose to be represented by a buyer’s agent. But that would cut the
listing agent’s commission. If it is indeed true that most buyers that agree to
designated agency representations A or B are unlikely to fully understand that the
agent is not obligated to act in their best interest, one can postulate that, everything
else constant, they are paying more for a given property than they would have if
they were represented by a buyer’s agent. Consequently, one would see a higher
sale price for agency representations A and B. However, a conﬂict of interest may
also emerge between the listing agent and the seller, the result of which may lead
to a lower sale price. If a potential buyer has agreed to agency representations A
or B, the listing agent receives the full commission when the sale materializes.
Rather than risking that the current buyer declines to buy and is replaced by a
buyer who is represented by a buyer’s agent, it is in the listing agent’s interest to
convince the seller to accept a lower price, even though that may not be in the
best interest of the seller.4 Hence, based on a priori reasoning, it is not clear
whether or not agency representations A and B lead to a higher or lower price.168  Zietz and Newsome
Scenario C has room for several potential conﬂicts of interest to develop. The
buyer’s agent may try to push his/her broker’s or ﬁrm’s listings ﬁrst rather than
to look out only for the interests of the buyer. This may be particularly prevalent
if the buyer’s agent works for the same real estate broker as the listing agent. As
the broker has a vested interest in not involving other brokers and, thus, sharing
the commission, he/she may pressure his/her agents to steer buyers to his/her
own listings. Similar pressure may be exerted by the real estate ﬁrm to keep the
sale to the listings of the ﬁrm to avoid part of the commission going to another
real estate ﬁrm. How this plays out for the price that the buyer is paying is
ambiguous. A higher price may result because buyers are purposely not shown
properties with a better price/value ratio. A lower price may result because the
listing agent is pressuring the seller to accept a lower offer. In either case, a conﬂict
of interest exists between the broker’s or ﬁrm’s interest to avoid splitting the
commission and the best interests of their clients. A conﬂict of interest exists for
the buyer’s agent also in that he/she may steer the potential buyer to properties
that offer the highest buyer’s agent commission rather than to those properties that
are best suited for the buyer. Such behavior would concentrate demand on those
properties with the highest buyer’s agent commission and would, therefore, likely
raise the sale price. The involvement of a buyer’s agent would not be advantageous
to the buyer. Zietz and Newsome (2001) have uncovered some evidence in this
respect.
In scenario D, where seller and buyer are represented by agents from different
real estate ﬁrms, one would suspect fewer conﬂicts of interest to exist. In fact, the
only apparent one for the buyer’s agent is that he/she may steer the buyer to those
listings with the highest buyer’s agent commission rather than to the one most
suited to the buyer.
 Data and Estimation Results
Data
The study uses MLS data from the Orem/Provo (Utah) region.5 The useable data
set consists of a total of 1334 observations and covers home sales from mid-1999
to mid-2000. MLS data have both advantages and disadvantages for this study.
Chief among the advantages is the fact that the results can be easily re-examined
on other similar data sets. This is arguably of some importance for an exploratory
study such as this. Also, there is no shortage of housing characteristics that may
be of importance for determining price. The main disadvantage of using MLS data
is that there are no data on buyer characteristics. This is a problem for most
hedonic price functions in real estate that are based on MLS data. Sometimes an
attempt is made to use locational variables in conjunction with certain housing
characteristics to approximate buyers’ characteristics. A similar approach is taken
in this study. In particular, all observations are geo-coded to construct variables
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centers, the closest interstate highway, the slope of the property, its earthquake
history, the school district, and numerous demographic variables of the census
tract that the property is located in.6
Exhibit 1 provides a description of the variables used in this study. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of the sale price (SP) for all regressions. The
variables BASFIRM and NOBA are central to identifying the impact of agent
representation on price. These two dummy variables make it possible to
differentiate among three of the four scenarios. Scenario D, where the buyer’s
agent comes from a different real estate ﬁrm than the listing agent, is the base
case, which accounts for 54.9% of all sales. Scenario C, where buyer’s agent and
listing agent come from the same ﬁrm, accounts for 12.9% of all transactions.
This scenario is identiﬁed by the variable BASFIRM taking on the value of unity.
In scenarios A and B, which jointly account for 32.2% of all sales in the sample,
no buyer’s agent is involved. Since the MLS data do not distinguish between these
two cases, the variable NOBA takes on the value of unity for both scenarios A
and B.
Insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for both NOBA and BASFIRM imply that the type of
agency representation plays no role for the sale price of a house. A positive
coefﬁcient for variable NOBA combined with an insigniﬁcant variable BASFIRM
means that by employing a buyer’s agent a buyer can reduce the sale price of a
house regardless of whether the buyer’s agent comes from the same ﬁrm as the
listing agent or not. Positive coefﬁcients for both NOBA and BASFIRM suggest
that a buyer’s agent from outside the ﬁrm of the listing agent can achieve a lower
price for the buyer than any other agency arrangement.
The relative size of the coefﬁcients of NOBA and BASFIRM provide an indication
of the relative importance of the conﬂict of interest that exists for the listing agent
on the one hand and the brokerage ﬁrm on the other. As suggested earlier, it is
conceivable that BASFIRM has a negative coefﬁcient. Such a result would suggest
that the ﬁrm’s agents have either managed to prod the seller into accepting a lower
price than necessary or they are willing to reduce their commission in order to
avoid losing a sale. The ﬁrst possibility would point toward a conﬂict between
the listing ﬁrm’s interest in keeping the commission inside the ﬁrm and the seller’s
interest in the highest possible sale price.
The variable BAC is central to the issue whether and to what extent the buyer’s
agent commission affects the sale price.7 A positive value for BAC, as found by
Zietz and Newsome (2001), would suggest that listing agents can attract more
buyer’s agents to properties that offer higher commissions and the increased
demand makes for a higher price. It is of interest not only whether this positive
effect of BAC also emerges for the current data set but also how any price effect
that originates with BAC compares and/or interacts with the price effects that may
exist for the type of agency representation.
The variables in Exhibit 1 and all following exhibit are arranged into three
groups to make the interpretation of the estimation results more transparent.170  Zietz and Newsome
Exhibit 1  Variable Deﬁnitions and Basic Statistics
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Min Max
SP Sale price in dollars; log(SP)  dependent
variable
146894 90000 247000
SIZE Square feet of house  acres*1,000 2454 830 4904
Elasticities’ Variables
ACRES Lot size in acres 0.25 0.01 2.10
SQFT Size of house in square feet 2205 792 4584
YEAR Year in which the property was built 1975 1877 2000
Marginal Effects’ Variables
BAC Buyer’s agent commission, percentage of
sale price
2.93 0 5
BEDR Number of bedrooms 3.77 1 7
BATHF Number of full bathrooms 1.63 0 4
BATHT Number of 3/4 bathrooms (shower, no tub) 0.37 0 3
BATHH Number of half baths 0.20 0 3
DINK Number of dining areas in kitchen 0.88 0 2
DINF Number of formal dining rooms 0.10 0 2
FIREP Number of ﬁreplaces 0.61 0 3
BASMT Percentage of house covered by ﬁnished
basement
0.45 0 1
GARAGE Number of garage places 1.39 0 5
DECK Number of decks 0.27 0 3
DI15 Distance to interstate Highway 15, in miles
(U.S. topographical map)
1.51 0.01 5.61
DOREM Distance to city center of Orem, in miles
(U.S. topographical map)
6.27 0.26 18.24
DPROVO Distance to city center of Provo, in miles
(U.S. topographical map)
8.85 0.38 20
EARTHQK Magnitude of largest earthquake, on Richter
Scale (EPA data)
1.55 0.12 4.08
PCTSLOPE Percentage slope of property (U.S.
topographical map)
2.18 0.00 17.32
POPLS18 Percentage of population less than 18
years, by census tract
37.77 7.0 48.1
POPOT65 Percentage of population older than 65
years, by census tract
6.71 1.5 19.2
FAMILY Family households as a percentage of all
households, by census tract
85.10 44.8 95.6The Sale Price of Houses  171
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Exhibit 1  (continued)
Variable Deﬁnitions and Basic Statistics
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Min Max
WITHCHD Percentage of households with own children
under 18, by census tract
53.93 13.3 75.3
ALONE65 Householder 65 years and over living alone
as percentage of all households, by tract
4.61 1.3 13.7
PERHH Average population per household, by
census tract
3.72 2.76 4.73
NWHITRAT Percentage of population classiﬁed as non-
white, by census tract
7.24 1.96 22.59
VRATE Percentage of vacant housing units, by
census tract
3.48 1.06 7.78
FORRENT Percentage of all vacant housing units for
rent, by census tract
22.97 0 75.7
FORSALE Percentage of all vacant housing units for
sale only, by census tract
34.57 0 71.4
Percentage Effects’ Variables
NOBA 1 if only listing agent is involved in sale, no
buyer’s agent, 0 otherwise
0.322 0 1
BASFIRM 1 if buyer’s agent is from the same ﬁrm as
the listing agent, 0 otherwise
0.129 0 1
AIREL 1 if air conditioning is electric, 0 otherwise 0.256 0 1
AIRGAS 1 if air conditioning is gas, 0 otherwise 0.065 0 1
FLHAR 1 if hardwood ﬂooring is present in house,
0 otherwise
0.274 0 1
FLTIL 1 if tile ﬂooring is present in house, 0
otherwise
0.256 0 1
EXTU 1 if exterior is stucco, 0 otherwise 0.142 0 1
EXBRI 1 if exterior is brick, 0 otherwise 0.702 0 1
EXALU 1 if exterior is aluminum or vinyl, 0
otherwise
0.549 0 1
EXFRA 1 if exterior is frame, 0 otherwise 0.066 0 1
LOTSPR 1 if sprinkler is present on lot, 0 otherwise 0.548 0 1
SCHOOLD1 1 if school district Alpine, 0
otherwise—base is Provo school district
0.732 0 1
SCHOOLD2 1 if school district Nebo, 0 otherwise—base
is Provo school district
0.168 0 1
Note: Table is the full sample of 1334 observations.172  Zietz and Newsome
Elasticity variables are converted into logarithmic form for the purpose of
estimation. Their estimated coefﬁcients have to be interpreted as elasticities. The
estimated coefﬁcients of the marginal effects variables can be converted into the
absolute change in sale price that results from a unit change in the variable if one
multiplies the estimated coefﬁcient by the mean value of sale price for the given
sample. The estimated coefﬁcients of the 0/1 variables listed under percentage
effects variables give the approximate percentage change in sale price that results
if the variable switches from zero to one.8
Estimation Results
Least Squares Regressions on Full Sample. The ﬁrst model in Exhibit 2 presents
the parameter estimates for the complete sample of 1334 observations. The
statistical adequacy tests reported at the bottom of Exhibit 2 strongly suggest that
this model does not capture the data generating process. In particular, there is
evidence of heteroscedasticity, functional form misspeciﬁcation, structural
instability and spatial autocorrelation. The simultaneous occurrence of these
problems may suggest neglected parameter heterogeneity,9 a point earlier raised
by Newsome and Zietz (1992) and Zietz and Newsome (2001).
The second model in Exhibit 2 examines the sensitivity of the regression results
to the presence of outliers in the data set. In particular, the second regression
excludes outliers as deﬁned by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980: 11–18). Excluding
thirty-six observations that fall into the outlier category has no apparent impact
on the statistical adequacy tests. However, the outlier removal does have a
signiﬁcant effect on one of the three variables of particular interest in this study.
The variable BAC almost doubles in value and becomes statistically different from
zero as outliers are removed.10
As is typical for hedonic price functions in real estate, there is some collinearity
among the regressors. Multicollinearity can give rise to serious inference problems
if the variables of interest are highly correlated among each other or with other
model variables. The seriousness of this problem is examined by the calculation
of variance inﬂation factors. As suggested by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980),
factors in excess of ten point toward a potential collinearity problem. For the full
data set of 1334 observations, the variance inﬂation factors for the variables BAC,
NOBA and BASFIRM are: BAC  1.083, NOBA  1.137 and BASFIRM  1.103.
All three factors are far below the critical level of ten, which means that
multicollinearity is not a problem as it relates to inferences about the three
variables of interest in this study.11
For completeness, the last two columns in Exhibit 2 give the economic
interpretation of the coefﬁcient estimates for both the least squares model with
and without outliers. Marginal Effects are derived as the estimated coefﬁcients
multiplied by the mean of the sale price. The Percentage Effect for a given
coefﬁcient b is calculated as eb  1. Marginal Effects give the change in saleThe Sale Price of Houses  173
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Exhibit 2  Least Squares Regression Results on Full Sample











Variable Coefﬁcient t-Values Coefﬁcient t-Values
Constant 12.0141 3.73 12.1453 3.64 Elasticities
ln ACRES 0.0509 5.26 0.0578 5.58 0.05 0.06
ln SQFT 0.2182 15.47 0.2169 15.42 0.22 0.22
ln YEAR 2.8887 6.80 2.9126 6.62 2.89 2.91
Marginal
Effects
BAC 0.0109 1.66 0.0186 2.50 1,603 2,728
BEDR 0.0029 0.78 0.0032 0.84 419 464
BATHF 0.0618 9.77 0.0609 9.39 9,072 8,948
BATHT 0.0339 5.52 0.0331 5.22 4,987 4,863
BATHH 0.0308 4.61 0.0304 4.33 4,524 4,465
DINK 0.0023 0.42 0.0022 0.39 331 320
DINF 0.0190 1.88 0.0174 1.66 2,785 2,554
FIREP 0.0030 0.72 0.0028 0.66 438 409
BASMT 0.0098 1.39 0.0094 1.31 1,443 1,376
GARAGE 0.0239 6.46 0.0237 6.32 3,514 3,482
DECK 0.0000 0.00 0.0006 0.12 1 94
DI15 0.0101 2.88 0.0095 2.56 1,488 1,402
DOREM 0.0074 2.91 0.0058 1.76 1,083 852
DPROVO 0.0070 2.76 0.0047 1.45 1,021 696
EARTHQK 0.0103 2.15 0.0103 2.06 1,512 1,509
PCTSLOPE 0.0005 0.42 0.0007 0.47 80 101
POPLS18 0.0021 0.72 0.0018 0.55 307 267
POPOT65 0.0064 1.86 0.0049 1.21 945 720
FAMILY 0.0014 1.03 0.0002 0.15 207 34
WITHCHD 0.0006 0.34 0.0008 0.45 82 111
ALONE65 0.0079 2.42 0.0061 1.69 1,167 901
PERHH 0.0245 1.22 0.0389 1.77 3,606 5,717
NWHITRAT 0.0026 1.64 0.0014 0.85 386 209
VRATE 0.0033 1.21 0.0006 0.20 488 87
FORRENT 0.0003 1.06 0.0003 0.90 41 38
FORSALE 0.0002 0.63 0.0001 0.42 28 20174  Zietz and Newsome
Exhibit 2  (continued)
Least Squares Regression Results on Full Sample











Variable Coefﬁcient t-Values Coefﬁcient t-Values
Percentage
Effects
NOBA 0.0043 0.74 0.0048 0.83 0.004 0.005
BASFIRM 0.0041 0.53 0.0061 0.77 0.004 0.006
AIREL 0.0356 6.13 0.0342 5.82 0.036 0.035
AIRGAS 0.0069 0.67 0.0094 0.92 0.007 0.009
FLHAR 0.0344 6.28 0.0355 6.35 0.035 0.036
FLTIL 0.0171 3.03 0.0177 3.11 0.017 0.018
EXTU 0.0691 6.90 0.0706 6.86 0.072 0.073
EXBRI 0.0026 0.40 0.0030 0.47 0.003 0.003
EXALU 0.0169 2.70 0.0191 2.98 0.017 0.019
EXFRA 0.0174 1.75 0.0204 1.98 0.018 0.021
LOTSPR 0.0248 4.62 0.0270 4.97 0.025 0.027
SCHOOLD1 0.0758 2.88 0.0519 1.57 0.079 0.053
SCHOOLD2 0.0692 3.54 0.0544 2.55 0.072 0.056
PValues for test of:
Homoscedasticity 0.000 0.000
Functional form 0.000 0.000
Structural stability 0.000 0.000
No spatial autocorrelation 0.001 0.004
R2 0.7723 0.7706
Notes: Sample size with outliers is 1,224; sample size without outliers is 1,298. The log of sale price
(SP) is the dependent variable. The null of homoscedasticity is checked by the BreuschPagan (1979)
test; the null of correct functional form by Ramsey’s (1969) Reset test; the null of structural stability by
a Chow test that is robust to heteroscedasticity (MAC2 of Thursby, 1992), the null of nospatial
autocorrelation by Moran’s I test with a standardized weight matrix (Cliff and Ord, 1972). Outlier
identiﬁcation follows Belsley et al. (1980, 11-18). tvalues are robust to heteroscedasticity by
application of a jackknife approximation as discussed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993: 55256).The Sale Price of Houses  175
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price that results from a unit change in the variable of interest. Percentage Effects
provide the percentage change in sale price if the associated dummy variable
switches from zero to one.
Least Squares Regressions on Subsamples. Suggesting that housing characteristics
do not have a unique price across the sample is uncommon in real estate valuation.
However, hedonic price theory does not rule out this case. In fact, theory can
justify it by assuming heterogeneous buyer preferences (e.g., Triplett, 1987: 632).
In particular, if preferences for housing attributes differ among buyers, then buyers
can face different attribute prices even though they are located on the same
hedonic price surface.12
Finding statistical evidence that is consistent with parameter heterogeneity is
relatively easy. Performing the next step and identifying homogeneous subsamples
of the data set is considerably more involved. It also gives rise to potential
statistical pitfalls. For example, identifying subsamples by price, that is, by the
size of the dependent variable, can generate biased parameter estimates as
discussed in detail by Heckman (1979).13 By contrast, deﬁning subsamples by the
size of some independent variable is perfectly legitimate (Koenker and Hallock,
2001). This latter approach will be taken in this study.
If one wants to allow for different attribute prices along the hedonic surface, some
auxiliary assumptions are needed to tie unobservable buyer preferences to
observable variables. For the purpose of this study, two auxiliary assumptions are
made. First, it is assumed that differences in buyer preferences are systematically
related to unobserved buyer characteristics. Second, it is assumed that an
observable variable exists that is closely related to these unobservable buyer
characteristics so that attribute prices vary systematically with that observable
variable. It is conjectured that property SIZE, a weighted average of square footage
and acreage, is such an observable variable.14 The rationale for choosing SIZE is
as follows. Houses characterized by smaller size are likely to be preferred by
young, smaller families that are looking for a starter home or by older retired
couples with a preference for smallness. It is also likely that less educated buyers
opt for homes of a smaller size because they are liquidity constrained over their
lifetime. What may potentially tie these buyer groups together is that they may
be less aggressive in real estate dealings, either because they are less experienced
or because they put more value on absence of conﬂict. That should give real estate
agents some leverage in inﬂuencing the behavior of these buyers. In obvious
analogy, one would expect that buyers that opt for larger-sized properties are, on
average, more experienced and aggressive and are, therefore, less likely inﬂuenced
by the negotiating tactics of real estate agents.
If one assumes that the coefﬁcients of the three variables of interest depend on
property SIZE, one can estimate a model that includes interaction terms between
these three variables and SIZE. The estimates of such a model do indeed suggest
that the coefﬁcients of BAC and BASFIRM change with property SIZE. However,
the statistical adequacy tests of such an amended model are not any more
encouraging than those reported in Exhibit 2.176  Zietz and Newsome
Rather than trying out interaction terms with SIZE for each and every variable,
the data are sorted by SIZE and regressions like those of Exhibit 2 are run on
subsamples of the data. The results of the regressions on four such subsamples
are reported in Exhibit 3. The subsamples are determined from the sorted data as
follows. Starting from the 200 observations with the lowest SIZE, the sample is
successively enlarged to the point where adding more observations would lead to
a decisive and permanent structural break, as evidenced by a heteroscedasticity-
consistent Chow test,15 or evidence of a wrong functional form, as tested by
Ramsey’s (1969) Reset. This process generates the size class identiﬁed as Small
Size in Exhibit 3. The process of ﬁnding statistically viable subsamples of
observations is repeated starting from the end of the ﬁrst subsample and so forth.16
It is noteworthy that the subsample regressions reported in Exhibit 3 provide no
evidence of spatial autocorrelation even at the 10% level of statistical signiﬁcance.
This result suggests that spatial autocorrelation and parameter heterogeneity may
be directly related, a point that requires further study in light of the prominence
given to spatial autocorrelation issues in the more recent hedonic price literature
(Pace, Barry and Sirmans, 1998). The apparent absence of parameter heterogeneity
for the regressions of Exhibit 3 makes heteroscedasticity, which shows up in three
of the four size classes, easy to deal with: the t-values for the coefﬁcient estimates
can be and are taken from a heteroscedasticity robust variance covariance matrix.17
The regressions of Exhibit 3 reveal rather different coefﬁcients across subsamples
both in size, sign and statistical signiﬁcance. This is particularly apparent for the
elasticity variables but also applies to the three coefﬁcients of key interest in this
study, BAC, NOBA and BASFIRM. Given these apparent differences, it is not
surprising that the regressions on the full sample reported in Exhibit 2 reveal
signiﬁcant statistical problems.
Exhibit 4 provides summary statistics on the untransformed variables for each of
the four size classes. It is apparent that the mean values by size class of most
neighborhood variables are either positively or negatively related to the
classiﬁcation variable SIZE. This suggests that the variable SIZE may indeed be
a useful proxy for key but unobserved buyer characteristics.
Economic Interpretation of Subsample Results. To discuss the substantive results,
it is convenient to move to Exhibit 5, which contains the elasticities, marginal
effects and percentage effects for sale price that are implied by the coefﬁcient
estimates of Exhibit 3. The following results emerge for the price effects of agency
representation.
The variable NOBA is statistically signiﬁcant at better than the 5% level only for
small- to medium-sized properties. Exhibit 5 reveals that buyers of these types of
properties are paying on average about 2% more because they are not represented
by a buyer’s agent. Since BASFIRM is statistically insigniﬁcant for this size class,
it does not matter whether or not the buyer’s agent comes from inside or outside
the listing ﬁrm. Buyers of smaller and larger properties do not pay a premium for













































Exhibit 3  Least Squares Regressions on Subsamples, With Data Ordered by Property Size
Small Size Small to Medium Size Medium to Large Size Large Size
With Outliers With Outliers Without Outliers With Outliers With Outliers
Variables Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue
Constant 4.815 0.63 13.828 3.26 15.009 3.51 8.813 1.20 40.700 4.37
ln ACRES 0.014 0.84 0.042 2.84 0.042 2.13 0.052 1.60 0.075 3.89
ln SQFT 0.099 1.88 0.238 3.98 0.252 3.86 0.095 0.72 0.230 4.05
ln YEAR 0.798 0.81 3.088 5.36 3.230 5.56 2.621 2.69 6.702 5.43
BAC 0.010 0.82 0.029 2.86 0.033 3.01 0.003 0.21 0.013 0.85
BEDR 0.023 1.80 0.004 0.60 0.007 1.06 0.014 1.81 0.003 0.55
BATHF 0.054 3.22 0.056 4.96 0.049 4.44 0.077 6.00 0.040 3.24
BATHT 0.038 1.68 0.041 3.25 0.034 2.65 0.033 2.49 0.014 1.19
BATHH 0.020 1.15 0.036 2.80 0.033 2.54 0.019 1.13 0.020 1.65
DINK 0.023 1.64 0.003 0.33 0.007 0.78 0.024 1.96 0.007 0.81
DINF 0.007 0.23 0.009 0.65 0.011 0.79 0.027 0.97 0.013 0.84
FIREP 0.017 1.05 0.003 0.41 0.003 0.45 0.004 0.46 0.010 1.22
BASMT 0.002 0.10 0.002 0.15 0.003 0.27 0.004 0.24 0.015 0.93
GARAGE 0.024 2.61 0.028 4.36 0.026 4.18 0.022 2.85 0.009 0.92
DECK 0.030 1.42 0.007 0.82 0.005 0.56 0.002 0.16 0.001 0.15
DI15 0.008 0.63 0.004 0.78 0.002 0.35 0.004 0.53 0.012 1.72
DOREM 0.002 0.27 0.004 0.78 0.005 0.92 0.001 0.16 0.004 1.00
DPROVO 0.006 0.89 0.002 0.35 0.002 0.29 0.004 0.59 0.005 1.25



















Exhibit 3  (continued)
Least Squares Regressions on Subsamples, With Data Ordered by Property Size
Small Size Small to Medium Size Medium to Large Size Large Size
With Outliers With Outliers Without Outliers With Outliers With Outliers
Variables Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue
PCTSLOPE 0.009 1.74 0.005 0.96 0.008 2.11 0.002 0.63 0.004 1.73
POPLS18 0.013 1.54 0.001 0.24 0.001 0.28 0.008 1.55 0.001 0.18
POPOT65 0.011 0.94 0.001 0.10 0.004 0.62 0.012 1.42 0.001 0.17
FAMILY 0.003 0.54 0.001 0.34 0.001 0.56 0.003 0.95 0.001 0.36
WITHCHD 0.006 1.15 0.002 0.80 0.001 0.54 0.000 0.10 0.001 0.32
ALONE65 0.013 1.15 0.000 0.01 0.001 0.25 0.007 0.84 0.003 0.36
PERHH 0.010 0.21 0.044 1.10 0.067 1.58 0.026 0.58 0.004 0.08
NWHITRAT 0.006 1.46 0.000 0.10 0.002 0.52 0.007 2.08 0.006 1.56
VRATE 0.012 1.18 0.006 1.03 0.003 0.45 0.009 1.43 0.000 0.03
FORRENT 0.001 1.04 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.64 0.001 0.99 0.000 0.14
FORSALE 0.001 0.97 0.000 0.86 0.000 0.81 0.001 1.38 0.000 0.21
NOBA 0.004 0.32 0.020 2.12 0.023 2.47 0.005 0.41 0.001 0.05
BASFIRM 0.014 0.68 0.003 0.24 0.003 0.27 0.038 2.07 0.008 0.52
AIREL 0.008 0.60 0.028 3.04 0.027 2.95 0.028 2.31 0.045 3.82
AIRGAS 0.027 0.95 0.015 0.62 0.004 0.15 0.012 0.65 0.026 1.39
FLHAR 0.017 1.22 0.022 2.19 0.019 1.93 0.012 0.94 0.050 4.86
FLTIL 0.022 1.41 0.017 1.82 0.018 1.95 0.001 0.08 0.022 2.02













































Exhibit 3  (continued)
Least Squares Regressions on Subsamples, With Data Ordered by Property Size
Small Size Small to Medium Size Medium to Large Size Large Size
With Outliers With Outliers Without Outliers With Outliers With Outliers
Variables Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue Coefﬁcient tValue
EXBRI 0.021 1.79 0.013 1.37 0.016 1.67 0.030 1.93 0.008 0.50
EXALU 0.019 1.53 0.010 0.87 0.012 1.03 0.054 3.62 0.014 1.13
EXFRA 0.011 0.50 0.021 1.30 0.018 1.06 0.033 0.97 0.016 0.74
LOTSPR 0.041 3.12 0.019 2.15 0.017 1.83 0.017 1.51 0.035 2.89
SCHOOLD1 0.030 0.47 0.019 0.36 0.015 0.23 0.028 0.38 0.063 1.39
SCHOOLD2 0.049 1.23 0.049 1.27 0.051 1.23 0.030 0.66 0.071 1.51
PValues for tests of:
Homoscedasticity 0.050 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.006
Functional form 0.026 0.036 0.064 0.058 0.254
Structural stability 0.123 0.202 0.210 0.292 0.016
No. spatial autocorr. 0.173 0.339 0.283 0.219 0.343
R2 0.5999 0.6775 0.6842 0.5983 0.6017
Notes: Sample size for small size with outliers is 222; sample size for small to medium size with outliers is 358; sample size for medium to large size without



















Exhibit 4  Basic Statistics on Variables, By Property Size Class
Small Size Small to Medium Size Medium to Large Size Large Size
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
SP 119820 90000 164583 133794 100000 190000 145717 99000 204000 172666 107000 247000
SIZE 1487 830 1812 2066 1813 2286 2490 2287 2704 3250 2708 4904
Elasticities’ Variables
ACRES 0.20 0.01 0.52 0.22 0.01 0.99 0.24 0.01 1.30 0.31 0.01 2.10
SQFT 1291 792 1717 1849 949 2155 2252 1015 2604 2937 875 4584
YEAR 1958 1877 2000 1972 1889 2000 1979 1900 2000 1982 1894 2000
Marginal Effects Variables
BAC 2.92 0 5 2.88 0 5 2.96 0 5 2.96 0 5
BEDR 3.00 2 5 3.65 1 6 3.90 2 6 4.18 2 7
BATHF 1.23 0 3 1.54 1 3 1.68 0 4 1.88 0 4
BATHT 0.15 0 2 0.29 0 2 0.37 0 2 0.57 0 3
BATHH 0.15 0 1 0.17 0 2 0.16 0 3 0.28 0 2
DINK 0.80 0 2 0.90 0 2 0.92 0 2 0.86 0 2
DINF 0.05 0 1 0.05 0 1 0.08 0 2 0.17 0 2
FIREP 0.30 0 2 0.47 0 2 0.56 0 2 0.92 0 3
BASMT 0.16 0 1 0.53 0 1 0.50 0 1 0.48 0 1
GARAGE 0.94 0 2 1.18 0 3 1.40 0 3 1.79 0 5
DECK 0.09 0 1 0.29 0 2 0.26 0 1 0.36 0 3
DI15 1.17 0.01 3.42 1.20 0.02 4.82 1.47 0.01 5.51 1.98 0.01 5.61













































Exhibit 4  (continued)
Basic Statistics on Variables, By Property Size Class
Small Size Small to Medium Size Medium to Large Size Large Size
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
DPROVO 7.31 0.40 19.32 8.74 0.54 19.98 9.45 0.38 19.98 9.29 0.70 20.00
EARTHQK 1.80 0.24 3.78 1.60 0.12 4.00 1.56 0.14 4.08 1.37 0.16 4.06
PCTSLOPE 1.62 0.00 10.32 1.74 0.00 14.97 2.32 0.00 11.85 2.72 0.00 17.32
POPLS18 34.90 7.0 48.0 37.08 12.2 48.1 38.40 7.0 48.1 39.34 15.7 48.1
POPOT65 6.93 1.5 19.2 6.62 2.0 17.8 6.66 1.5 19.2 6.70 2.0 19.2
FAMILY 80.94 44.8 95.1 83.94 44.8 95.1 85.85 47.8 95.1 87.65 44.8 95.6
WITHCHD 49.31 13.3 74.1 52.90 18.6 75.3 54.99 13.3 75.3 56.38 21.7 75.3
ALONE65 5.14 1.3 13.7 4.75 1.3 10.7 4.58 1.3 13.7 4.26 1.3 13.7
PERHH 3.46 2.88 4.53 3.62 2.76 4.73 3.76 2.86 4.73 3.89 2.98 4.73
NWHITRAT 9.32 3.23 18.89 8.12 2.50 22.59 6.74 2.50 22.59 5.80 1.96 18.87
VRATE 3.82 1.21 7.78 3.62 1.06 6.75 3.40 1.06 7.78 3.25 1.06 7.78
FORRENT 30.05 0.0 75.7 24.16 0.0 75.7 21.71 0.0 75.7 19.26 0.0 75.7
FORSALE 28.39 0.0 71.4 33.15 0.0 71.4 35.25 0.0 71.4 38.42 0.0 71.4
Percentage Effects Variables
NOBA 0.32 0 1 0.29 0 1 0.34 0 1 0.34 0 1
BASFIRM 0.14 0 1 0.12 0 1 0.12 0 1 0.14 0 1
AIREL 0.21 0 1 0.18 0 1 0.23 0 1 0.36 0 1
AIRGAS 0.05 0 1 0.06 0 1 0.06 0 1 0.08 0 1



















Exhibit 4  (continued)
Basic Statistics on Variables, By Property Size Class
Small Size Small to Medium Size Medium to Large Size Large Size
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
FLTIL 0.20 0 1 0.21 0 1 0.24 0 1 0.33 0 1
EXTU 0.08 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.13 0 1 0.23 0 1
EXBRI 0.50 0 1 0.70 0 1 0.77 0 1 0.76 0 1
EXALU 0.47 0 1 0.64 0 1 0.63 0 1 0.46 0 1
EXFRA 0.10 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.06 0 1 0.05 0 1
LOTSPR 0.42 0 1 0.51 0 1 0.54 0 1 0.66 0 1
SCHOOLD1 0.57 0 1 0.70 0 1 0.79 0 1 0.79 0 1
SCHOOLD2 0.29 0 1 0.19 0 1 0.10 0 1 0.14 0 1The Sale Price of Houses  183
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Large Size Large Size
Elasticities
ACRES 0.014 0.042* 0.052 0.075*
SQFT 0.099 0.238* 0.095 0.230*
YEAR 0.798 3.088* 2.621* 6.702*
Marginal Effects
BAC 1224 3819* 426 2253
BEDR 2766 532 1980 589
BATHF 6500* 7481* 11228* 6840*
BATHT 4503 5447* 4803* 2395
BATHH 2377 4827* 2826 3420
DINK 2768 418 3429* 1281
DINF 879 1238 3878 2293
FIREP 2035 376 575 1677
BASMT 267 221 594 2581
GARAGE 2822* 3686* 3161* 1618
DECK 3617 981 272 239
DI15 909 583 622 2064
DOREM 196 547 173 721
DPROVO 758 257 621 842
EARTHQK 1061 1531 1425 61
PCTSLOPE 1123 630 257 736
POPLS18 1571 152 1146 197
POPOT65 1295 95 1680 247
FAMILY 374 104 439 188
WITHCHD 766 285 54 209
ALONE65 1540 6 957 469
PERHH 1144 5833 3777 613
NWHITRAT 775 40 953* 1090
VRATE 1390 823 1270 30
FORRENT 120 2 73 15
FORSALE 131 63 130 23
Percentage Effects
NOBA 0.004 0.020* 0.005 0.001
BASFIRM 0.014 0.003 0.037* 0.008
AIREL 0.008 0.029* 0.029* 0.046*184  Zietz and Newsome
Exhibit 5  (continued)





Large Size Large Size
AIRGAS 0.026 0.015 0.013 0.026
FLHAR 0.017 0.023* 0.012 0.051*
FLTIL 0.022 0.017 0.001 0.022*
EXTU 0.061 0.062* 0.126* 0.045*
EXBRI 0.021 0.013 0.031* 0.008
EXALU 0.019 0.010 0.056* 0.014
EXFRA 0.011 0.021 0.033 0.016
LOTSPR 0.042* 0.019* 0.017 0.035*
SCHOOLD1 0.031 0.019 0.029 0.065
SCHOOLD2 0.050 0.050 0.030 0.074
Notes: Marginal Effects are derived as estimated coefﬁcient times the mean of sale price for a given
subsample. The Percentage Effect for coefﬁcient b is given as exp(b)  1. Marginal Effects give the
change in sale price that results from a unit change in the variable of interest. Percentage Effects
provide the percentage change in sale price if the dummy variable switches from zero to one. All
price effects hold relative to the average variable values in the subsample for which they are
calculated.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better.
Exhibit 4 provides some information on the neighborhood characteristics of houses
in the small to medium size class, for which NOBA is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. It is apparent that the average property in this size class tends to be
located somewhat closer to interstate Highway 15 and to the city centers of Orem
and Provo than the average property (Exhibit 1). Compared to the full sample,
fewer family households and households with children can be found in this size
class, but a larger than average share of elderly people living alone and of
minorities (mainly Hispanics) can be found. In addition, an above average vacancy
rate and a larger share of rental properties point toward a more transient
environment. But for the same neighborhood variables, the small size class has a
more extreme mean than the class with small- to medium-sized properties. Hence,
it is difﬁcult to suggest that a linear or even monotonic relationship exists between
the economic behavior underlying the coefﬁcient of NOBA and neighborhood
characteristics. In particular, if one wants to read into the results that the price
effect of NOBA more heavily affects less experienced, less educated, older or
minority buyers, one needs some ancillary assumption to explain why the
coefﬁcient of NOBA is not the highest in the small size class. One somewhat
speculative explanation could be that real estate agents somehow refrain from
taking advantage of their most vulnerable clients.The Sale Price of Houses  185
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The variable BASFIRM is negative and economically signiﬁcant for medium to
large size properties. For this size class, the price is about 3.7% lower if both
buyer’s agent and listing agent come from the same ﬁrm as opposed to from
different ﬁrms. For all other size classes, the ﬁrm afﬁliation of buyer’s and listing
agents makes no difference to the sale price. This result contradicts some of the
arguments against designated agency relationships that are employed by consumer
advocacy groups and representatives of exclusive buyer brokers. In particular,
general statements that the allegiance of buyer’s agents to their real estate ﬁrm
matters for price are not supported by the data. There is also no evidence that
buyers get a lower price by employing a buyer’s agent from a different ﬁrm than
the listing agent’s. On the contrary, the evidence points in the opposite direction.
Buyers get a better deal from those buyer’s agents that share the same ﬁrm with
the listing agent.
Although buyers do not appear to be any worse off by employing a buyer’s agent
from the same ﬁrm as the listing agent’s, the same argument does not hold for
sellers. The negative sign of BASFIRM can imply one of two things. Either the
agents lower their joint commission to avoid getting other real estate ﬁrms
involved in the sale or they act to pressure the seller to give in to a lower sale
price. The second scenario is more likely because the ﬁrst scenario is inconsistent
with the fact that the percentage price reduction associated with BASFIRM (3.7%)
is considerably larger than the average buyer’s agent commission (2.9%) that
would have to be paid to the buyer’s agent from a different real estate ﬁrm. Hence,
it appears that the seller in the medium to large category ends up with a lower
price as a result of pressure by his/her listing agent. If this result can be conﬁrmed
in other studies, it would represent a classic conﬂict of interest between the
interests of the real estate ﬁrm that is listing the property and the seller. Such an
outcome would be of interest to regulators and law makers because it would
suggest a basic problem with the designated agency concept.
Exhibit 5 reveals that BAC is statistically signiﬁcant for the same size class as the
variable NOBA. For small- to medium-sized properties, a one percentage point
increase in the buyer’s agent commission is predicted to raise the price by about
$3,819, which is about 2.9% of the average sale price.18 This is a signiﬁcant price
effect not only ﬁnancially but also with regard to the issue of agency
representation. Speciﬁcally, the price effect from BAC implies that a redistribution
of the commission toward the buyer’s agent has the potential to more than
compensate for the price advantage that a buyer may receive from engaging a
buyer’s agent in the ﬁrst place. This result arises as follows. If a buyer engages a
buyer’s agent, NOBA is zero and buyers pay, on average, 2% less compared to
the case where they agree to limited dual agency or simply being a customer of
the listing agent. However, if buyers’ agents are attracted to houses with higher
buyer’s agent commissions, then buyers may pay a higher price because of that.
On balance, therefore, buyers may end up not being any better off by employing
a buyer’s agent. This points to a potential agency problem for all properties for
which the buyer’s agent commission is more than one percentage point above the186  Zietz and Newsome
average. The policy conclusion from this result appears straightforward: disclosure
should not be limited to the issue of who represents whom but it must include
the structure of the sales commission: who gets paid what.
 Conclusion
This study has used a local data set of broker-assisted MLS house sales to examine
whether and to what extent the type of agency representation inﬂuences the sale
price of a residential property. The major substantive ﬁnding is that the impact of
agency representation varies by property size. The type of agency representation
appears to play no role at all for very small and for large properties. However,
for property sizes in between these extremes, some statistically signiﬁcant effects
can be identiﬁed. These can be summarized as follows.
First, a typical buyer of a small- to medium-sized property that is not represented
by a buyer’s agent is likely to pay about 2% more for a property. This ﬁnding of
a price effect of the type of agent representation is consistent with popular claims
of buyer brokers, but it is different from that of previous studies (Elder, Zumpano
and Elder, 2000). However, the present study encompasses earlier work in the
sense that it explains why that work could not identify such a relationship: it only
exists for smaller properties and does not show up when hedonic price functions
are estimated across all property classes. The fact that the price effect is limited
to properties at the lower end of the size distribution appears plausible if one
assumes that typical buyers in this market segment are likely to be less experienced
and/or less aggressive in real estate dealings. Young families buying starter homes,
less educated buyers with lifetime liquidity constraints, or retired couples are likely
to ﬁt into this category. It would be of interest if a similar price effect can be
veriﬁed for other local data sets. If it can, then the designated agency concept
may have to be re-evaluated in terms of its effect on different demographic groups
of society.
Second, there is no evidence to suggest that a buyer’s agent who works for a
different ﬁrm than the one of the listing agent will be able to reduce the sale price
for buyers. In fact, for a sizable range of the size distribution the opposite appears
to be true: the sale price drops by about 3.7% if buyer’s agent and listing agent
come from the same ﬁrm. However, the fact that buyers may obtain a lower price
by engaging a buyer’s agent from the same ﬁrm as the listing agent raises the
issue of whether or not the listing ﬁrm is shortchanging the seller. The evidence
appears to suggest that the agency relationship between seller and listing agent
may be compromised. Further study with a more complete data set would be
useful to clarify this issue.19
Third, by raising the buyer’s agent commission by one percentage point, the listing
agent can raise the sale price of small- to medium-sized properties by almost 3%.
This ﬁnding points to a potential conﬂict of interest between buyers and buyer’s
agents. The positive price effect of the buyer’s agent commission suggests thatThe Sale Price of Houses  187
JRER  Vol. 24  No. 2 – 2002
buyer’s agents react to higher commissions as desired by listing agents: they steer
their clients toward these properties, which raises demand and sale price. When
this evidence is combined with the result that a buyer’s agent can lower the sale
price of a small- to medium-sized house by about 2%, then, on balance, engaging
the services of a buyer’s agent may not be a good idea if obtaining the lowest
sale price is the buyer’s key objective. To guard against such an outcome or, at
least, to make buyers aware of the incentives that drive buyer’s agents, it would
appear that disclosure rules should include the requirement for agents to lay open
the structure of the sales commission that is associated with a given property.20
 Appendix
  Variance Inflation Factors




Large Size Large Size
ln ACRES 1.19 1.38 1.51 1.72 1.42
ln SQFT 2.43 2.16 1.69 1.79 1.58
ln YEAR 2.11 2.87 2.34 2.30 2.03
BAC 1.08 1.15 1.52 1.22 1.08
BEDR 1.94 1.73 1.49 1.89 1.86
BATHF 2.56 2.20 2.26 2.24 3.34
BATHT 2.23 1.80 1.85 1.98 3.42
BATHH 1.18 1.49 1.35 1.34 1.27
DINK 1.12 1.25 1.22 1.26 1.15
DINF 1.09 1.22 1.21 1.17 1.17
FIREP 1.44 1.65 1.34 1.46 1.58
BASMT 1.58 1.78 1.59 1.92 1.84
GARAGE 1.62 1.93 1.64 1.92 1.42
DECK 1.12 1.27 1.20 1.23 1.15
DI15 1.91 2.41 1.83 2.44 2.26
DOREMa 22.54 19.70 29.34 57.21 19.88
DPROVOa 30.87 25.21 38.46 71.84 30.08
EARTHQK 2.64 4.72 2.87 2.50 3.11
PCTSLOPE 1.31 1.90 1.43 1.45 1.62
POPLS18a 45.26 72.77 42.49 55.93 48.67
POPOT65a 15.48 13.18 12.64 26.55 27.77
FAMILYa 15.31 28.03 11.77 18.11 18.49
WITHCHDa 49.00 58.40 48.63 70.19 57.87188  Zietz and Newsome
 Variance Inflation Factors (continued)




Large Size Large Size
ALONE65a 10.20 11.26 9.46 15.71 13.87
PERHHa 11.00 5.43 12.77 13.83 13.63
NWHITRAT 7.03 9.30 9.44 6.60 7.18
VRATE 1.68 1.85 1.95 1.84 2.35
FORRENT 3.36 4.99 4.10 3.23 3.91
FORSALE 3.89 6.84 4.89 4.39 3.96
NOBA 1.14 1.34 1.17 1.28 1.21
BASFIRM 1.10 1.32 1.22 1.24 1.22
AIREL 1.24 1.57 1.25 1.29 1.37
AIRGAS 1.14 1.54 1.48 1.20 1.14
FLHAR 1.07 1.32 1.13 1.15 1.15
FLTIL 1.07 1.29 1.15 1.21 1.09
EXTU 1.50 1.40 1.38 1.55 1.96
EXBRI 1.25 1.44 1.26 1.39 1.32
EXALU 1.45 1.58 1.74 1.60 1.50
EXFRA 1.11 1.28 1.25 1.28 1.12
LOTSPR 1.20 1.37 1.27 1.32 1.30
SCHOOLD1a 22.32 23.30 30.46 40.56 19.22
SCHOOLD2a 8.04 10.25 9.88 9.92 9.36
Notes:
aVariables have variance inﬂation factors above the critical level of ten. Their t-values in Exhibits 2
and 3 should be interpreted with caution.
 Endnotes
1 About twenty states have already enacted laws that are designed to abrogate the common
law of agency and to replace it with statutory laws that involve some form of designated
agency (Realty Times, Sept. 14, 2000).
2 The potential role of the buyer’s agent commission for evaluating agency representation
issues has recently been highlighted by Zietz and Newsome (2001).
3 This argument is typical for consumer advocacy groups (Realty Times, May 21, 1999)
and representatives of the National Association of Exclusive Buyer Agents’ (Realty
Times, April 5, 2000).
4 One way for the agent to prod the seller into accepting a lower price is to cut the
commission to close to what could be obtained if a buyer’s agent were involved. ThisThe Sale Price of Houses  189
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way the agent would do his/her part of lowering the price and this willingness to take
a pay cut could put signiﬁcant pressure on the seller to do his/her part in reducing the
price.
5 Utah law recognizes three types of agency arrangements: (1) a buyer’s agency in which
the agent represents solely the buyer; (2) a seller’s agency in which the agent represents
solely the seller; and (3) limited agency in which the agent represents both buyer and
seller in the same transaction and works to assist in negotiating a mutually acceptable
transaction while remaining neutral in the representation of buyer and seller. All real
estate agency agreements need to be put in writing before any offer is presented by the
agent.
6 Average income is not added because this variable has not been made available.
7 For a number of properties, listing agents offered buyer’s agents a ﬂat fee rather than a
percentage. This ﬂat fee has been converted to a percentage of the listing price.
8 The exact percentage change in sale price is calculated by taking the exponent of the
estimated coefﬁcient and subtracting one.
9 See Zietz (2001) for a recent discussion of the relationship between neglected parameter
heterogeneity and statistical adequacy tests, such as those for heteroscedasticity.
10 As suggested by a reviewer, the sensitivity of the coefﬁcient estimates is also checked
with respect to the inclusion of the variable ‘‘time-on-the-market.’’ The inclusion of this
variable has no impact on the three variables of interest, BAC, NOBA and BASFIRM.
This applies to the full data set as well as to all subsamples introduced in the next
section.
11 A table in the Appendix provides variance inﬂation factors for all variables and all data
sets used in this study.
12 See Brock and Durlauf (2001) for some of the general economic theory underlying
social interactions and their importance for the development of behavioral patterns within
and among social groupings.
13 If one wants to allow for parameter variation by price, the appropriate technique would
be quantile regression, as discussed by Koenker and Bassett (1978).
14 It is apparent that SIZE can be a sensible proxy only for some not all buyer
characteristics. One may argue that SIZE is likely to proxy some key buyer
characteristics, such as income and family size.
15 The MAC2 test suggested by Thursby (1992) is used. A standard Chow test is
inappropriate because Exhibit 2 suggests that heteroscedasticity may be present at least
at the 5% level of statistical signiﬁcance.
16 It is important to note in this context that statistically viable regressions similar to those
of Table 3 do not emerge for reasonably sized subsets of the data if the data are not
sorted or if the data are sorted by square footage, or by other variables. This point is
important because it implies that the regression results of Exhibit 3 are not of the hit-
and-miss type. In other words, there are any number of alternative subdivisions of the
data that also produce statistically viable regressions but that have potentially different
results.
17 A jackknife approximation is used, as discussed in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993:
552–56).
18 This ﬁnding is similar to that reported in Zietz and Newsome (2001) for a much smaller
data set and far fewer explanatory variables.190  Zietz and Newsome
19 Any reexamination would have to check the sensitivity of the results with regard to
agency size, as discussed in Benjamin, Jud and Sirmans (2000a,b), and those
characteristics of the buyer that are not captured by the size variable, such as the
willingness of the buyer to bargain.
20 One may note that the price effect of the buyer’s agent commission also raises some
doubts about claims by exclusive buyer’s agents that they do not have a conﬂict of
interest in their relationship with buyers. The key question in this context is whether
exclusive buyer brokers are immune to the incentives provided by above-average buyer’s
agent commissions.
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